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Note, International Commercial Arbitration in the United




In 1986, the Washington Foreign Law Society established the
Committee to Study the United Nations' Model Law (the "Model
Law") on International Commercial Arbitration.' In 1988, the Com-
mittee recommended that Congress not adopt the Model Law en bloc.
2
To justify its position, the Committee summarizes recent Supreme
Court decisions exemplifying the present environment in the United
States favoring international arbitration. 3 The Committee further ar-
gues that some Model Law articles 4 should be appended to the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)5 while other articles6 should be excluded. In
sum, the Committee suggests that "[e]xisting federal arbitration law is
stongly supportive in its enforcement of international agreements and
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards." They believe, how-
ever, that adoption of some Model Law provisions is more appropriate
than adoption of the whole Model Law.
7
The Committee, however, fails to provide satisfactory arguments
in its report. The Committee assumes a weak and often flawed posi-
tion toward the Model Law, making its conclusions largely un-
founded.8 A more comprehensive study and report of the issues
involved must be compiled before Congress will be able to decide
* University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1989.
1. The Model Law is the product of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
("UNCITRAL"). 40 G.A.O.R. Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, Annex I, at 81-93 (1985).
See infra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
See Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society on The UNCITRAL Model Law on Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration, 3 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RES. 303 (1988) [hereinafter Report].
In the Report, the Committee to study the Model Law [hereinafter Committee] argues against
adopting the entire Model Law. Alternatively the Commitee recommends amending present
domestic law to include three of the Model Law articles. See infra notes 2-8 and accompanying
text.
2. Report, supra note 1, at 311.
3. Id. at 309.
4. Model Law, supra note 1, arts. 9, 12, 20, & 28. Report, supra note 1, at 312-316.
5. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (originally enacted
Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 1, 43 Stat. 883) (amended by 68 Stat. 1233, Sept. 3, 1954) (Ch. 2 added July 31,
1970, 84 Stat. 692).
6. Model Law, supra note 1, arts. 16, 17, & 26. Report, supra note 1, at 316-317.
7. Report, supra note 1, at 311.
8, See infra pt. IV.
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whether or not to adopt the Model Law.9
This Note will explore some of the areas overlooked by the Com-
mittee, including the benefits and burdens which adopting the Model
Law would involve. Part One briefly describes the Model Law's back-
ground and provides a summary of its articles. Part Two discusses
some factors that should be considered when Congress decides
whether or not to adopt the Model Law. Part Three summarizes the
present status of international commercial arbitration law in the
United States, and recommends en bloc adoption of the Model Law.
Enacting a separate international arbitration law that is familiar to
foreigners will facilitate arbitration with U.S. parties. Additionally,
parties will be able to draft international arbitration agreements more
competently. As a result, arbitration will better serve its function as
an efficient alternative to litigation. Part Four follows with a discus-
sion of the Committee's analysis and recommendations. Part Five
analyzes the Model Law articles in light of the criteria used by the
Committee in its rejection of certain provisions. Part Six provides a
reason for rejecting the Model Law which, alternatively, is not based
upon its internal flaws.
I. THE MODEL LAW
A. Background
The Model Law's roots begin with the Asian-African Legal Con-
sultative Committee ("AALCC") recommending the review and pos-
sible amendment of the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards.' 0 The
AALCC abandoned this project, however, and in 1981 UNCITRAL,
envisioning a more comprehensive project, began preparing a draft of
the Model Law. " UNCITRAL approved the final version on June 21,
1985. On December 11, 1985, the U.N. General Assembly recom-
mended that states seriously consider adopting the Model Law.' 2
The Model Law was designed to cure problems in national arbitra-
tion laws which frustrate the operation of international arbitration
agreements. A major concern was that the law applicable to arbitra-
tion agreements implicates mandatory provisions which frustrate the
expectations of the parties. ' 3 Another concern involves problems re-
9. See The United Kingdom and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 3 ARB. INT'L 278 (1987), for a
complete analysis of British arbitration and the UNCITRAL Model Law. An explanation of
numerous options in terms of adoption are provided.
10. See Herrmann, UNCITRAL 'S Work Towards a Modern Law on International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 4 PACE L. REV. 537, 539 (1984).
11. In preparing the Model Law, the drafters took into account the 1958 New York Conven-
tion and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Id. at 540.
12. Report, supra note 1, at 305. The United States was represented in the drafting project
and was generally satisfied with the final product.
13. The drafters were concerned with mandatory provisions which (1) restricted party free-
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suiting from non-mandatory or non-existent provisions.' 4  In some
cases, parties might not have the foresight to opt out of unfavorable
non-mandatory provisions which frustrate their intentions. In other
situations, the law provides no answer to questions left open by the
parties in their agreement.' 5 Moreover, UNCITRAL focused espe-
cially on the harsh consequences arising from these obstacles as they
arise in international commercial arbitrations.' 6 National arbitration
laws differ widely, and quite often parties are unfamiliar with the ap-
plicable national laws. As a result, pitfalls in international arbitration
procedures are bound to occur.'
7
The Model Law attempts to overcome these pitfalls in interna-
tional commercial arbitration. It seeks to improve and harmonize na-
tional laws to facilitate international transactions.' 8 In an effort to
avoid frustrating parties' expectations, the Model Law recognizes their
freedom to determine how the arbitration will be conducted.' 9 The
Model Law also provides suppletory rules for the parties. 20 "[A] basic
objective of the Model Law is to provide a suitable 'emergency kit' for
getting an arbitration started and proceeding to the final settlement of
the dispute."'2' Finally, the Model Law tries to clarify New York
Convention provisions which, prior to the Model Law's adoption, had
been either disputed or confusing.
22
B. Summary of the Model Law
The Model Law contains eight separate chapters dealing with the
various stages of arbitration procedures, entitled:
I. General Provisions
II. Arbitration Agreement
doam to submit future disputes to arbitration or appoint arbitrators of choice, (2) prevented arbi-
tral tribunals from ruling on the issue of jurisdiction, and (3) restricted the tribunal from
conducting the proceedings according to the agreement of the parties.
14. Herrmann, supra note 10, at 542.




18. In order to achieve harmonization, adopting states are to give priority (as lex especialis)
to the Model Law over their own arbitration provisions. Contrary to the belief by some that the
drafters settled on the "lowest common denominator," the Model Law is the product of exten-
sive deliberation which resulted in workable solutions. Id. at 544-545.
19. Any agreement, however, is limited to provisions designed to prevent or remedy proce-
dural injustices or violations of due process of law. Id. at 546.
20. Note that with only a few exceptions, the Model Law articles setting forth the methods
by which arbitration will be run, and what rules will apply, carry the phrase "Unless otherwise
agreed by the parties."
21. Herrmann, supra note 10, at 546.
22. The Model Law tries to clarify issues under the New York Convention regarding the
written form of the arbitration agreement, interim measures by courts, and choice of substantive
law. Id. at 546-547.
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III. Composition of Arbitral Tribunal
IV. Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal
V. Conduct of Arbitration Proceedings
VI. Making of Award and Termination of Proceedings
VII. Recourse Against Award
VIII. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards
Chapter I. General Provisions
Model Law article 1 addresses the terms "international," "com-
mercial," and "arbitration." Article 1(3) defines "international" as
applying to arbitrations where (1) the parties are of different nationali-
ties, (2) the parties' places of business are located in different coun-
tries, or (3) the nature of the transaction is essentially international in
character. 23 The Model Law contains no specific definition of "com-
mercial," but a footnote in article 1(1) indicates that it should be given
wide interpretation. 24 Nor does the Model Law specifically define "ar-
bitration." Experts generally agree, however, that the Model Law is
intended to apply only to consensual arbitrations. 25
Other chapter I provisions include article 2 (providing additional
definitions), article 4 (permitting waiver of the right to object), and
article 6 (allowing the designation of a specific court to perform the
permitted judicial functions). Article 5, which limits judicial interven-
tion to those instances where the Model Law so provides, is a more
controversial provision. Although more expansive interpretations
have been suggested, the article 5 limitation on court intervention
presently relates only to a limited number of specific topics in the
Model Law. 26
Chapter II. Arbitration Agreement
Article 7 broadly defines "arbitration agreement." Under the
Model Law, an arbitration agreement may cover both existing and fu-
ture disputes. Like the New York Convention, article 7 requires that
23. A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 390 (1986) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER].
24. The article 1(1) footnote states:
The term "commercial" should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising
from all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of
a commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; com-
mercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engi-
neering; licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or
concession; joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-operation; carriage of
goods or passengers by air, sea, rail or road.
25. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 23, at 390.
26. Id. at 391.
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all agreements be in writing. 27
Article 8 requires a stay of judicial proceedings if a valid arbitra-
tion agreement exists. 28 Article 9 further indicates that a party may
seek interim measures of protection from a court before or during the
arbitral proceedings.
Chapter III. Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal
Articles 10 through 15 provide rules for the appointment, chal-
lenge, and replacement of arbitrators. The parties may appoint as
many arbitrators as they wish, if their agreement so stipulates. Other-
wise, the number shall be limited to three arbitrators. 29 The parties
also may agree on the methods by which the arbitrators will be ap-
pointed. 30 Absent such agreement, the article 6 court will appoint the
arbitrator.
3'
Under the Model Law, a party may challenge the appointment of
an arbitrator "only if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his impartiality or independence, or if he does not possess
qualifications agreed to by the parties."'32 Any potential arbitrator
also must disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to "justifiable
doubts" as to his impartiality or independence. 33 Moreover, unless the
parties agree otherwise, a party wishing to challenge the appointment
of an arbitrator must do so within fifteen days of either the creation of
the arbitral tribunal, or the time of their becoming aware of circum-
stances giving rise to justifiable doubt as to the arbitrator's impartiality
or independence.34 These articles allow the parties to ferret out all
challenges at an early stage, and limit their ability to disrupt the arbi-
tral proceeding with unmeritorious challenges.
35
Articles 14 and 15 apply to the appointment of substitute arbitra-
tors. Unless the parties agree otherwise, a replacement arbitrator will
be appointed in accordance with the same rules applied to the original
arbitrator. 36 Additionally, if the parties agree, they can remove an ar-
bitrator for failing to perform his functions.37
27. The writing, however, can be in the form of a telex, telegram, letter, or any other docu-
mented form. Model Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
28. Article 8 follows the wording of the New York Convention by permitting the court to
determine whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being
performed.
29. Model Law, supra note 1, art. 10.
30. Id. art. 1I. Moreover, the parties are free to select the nationalities of their arbitrators.
31. Id. art. 11(2).
32. Id. art. 12(2).
33. Id. art. 12(1).
34. Id. art. 13(2).
35. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 23, at 393.
36. Model Law, supra note 1, art. 15.
37. Id. arts. 14 & 15.
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Chapter IV. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Under the Model Law, the arbitral tribunal initially determines its
own jurisdiction. 38 The tribunal, however, does not always have the
final word on its jurisdiction. 39 Whenever the tribunal rules that it has
jurisdiction, a party may appeal the decision to the article 6 court.4°
The party challenging jurisdiction, however, must raise the issue by
the time of filing the defense statement or directly after the tribunal
decides that it has jurisdiction.4' A party objecting to jurisdiction is
permitted to participate in the arbitration, up to the statement of de-
fense, without prejudicing its case.42
Article 17 provides for interim protection measures by the tribu-
nal. The tribunal, however, is limited to granting protection relating
to the subject matter of the dispute and to security for costs in relation
to such measures.
Chapter V. Conduct of Arbitration Proceedings
Articles 18 through 27 govern the conduct of the arbitral proceed-
ings. Article 18 guarantees the parties' fundamental expectation that
they receive equal treatment and are given a full opportunity to pres-
ent their cases. The parties are free to determine the procedures to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal.43 For instance, the parties may spec-
ify the place and time for the arbitration.4" Absent an agreement,
however, the tribunal will determine the location. If the parties fail to
set a time for the commencement of arbitration, it is deemed to begin
when a party requests referral to arbitration. The parties may also
specify the languages to be used for the proceedings. 45 Absent such
agreement, the tribunal will specify the language(s) to be used.
Article 23 requires that a party "state the facts supporting his
claim, the points at issue and the relief or remedy sought."' 46 The par-
ties may not contract out of this provision, but are permitted to deter-
mine the means by which to accomplish this. For instance, they may
agree to dispense with a hearing.47 Moreover, when a party fails to
38. Id. art. 16. See infra at pt. IV for an analysis of this article.
39. If the tribunal rules that it has no jurisdiction, this decision is not appealable. However,
the losing party could go to court to get enforcement through a different arbitral tribunal under
article 8(1). 1 have not seen anything in the literature addressing this issue.
40. Model Law, supra note 1, art. 16(3).
41. Id. art. 16(2).
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 19. However, in this instance, the requirements of article 18 are a limitation. See
id. art. 19(1).
44. Id. arts. 20 & 21.
45. Id. art. 22.
46. Id. art. 23(1).
47. Id. art. 24(1). However, if the parties do not agree that no hearings will be had, "the
arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings ... if so requested by a party." Id.
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comply with article 23, the tribunal may nevertheless continue the
proceedings and issue an award upon the claims presented.48
Finally, under a procedural heading, articles 26 and 27 regulate
expert witness testimony and evidence admissibility. Article 26 per-
mits the tribunal to appoint an independent qualified expert to render
opinions. 49 Both parties may cross-examine any appointed expert wit-
ness. Article 27, provides that the tribunal, or any party with tribunal
approval, may apply for court assistance in compelling witness testi-
mony or production of evidence.
50
Chapter VI. Making of Award and Termination of Proceedings
Under the Model Law, the parties may determine the applicable
substantive law.' If the the parties do not agree, the tribunal will
specify the applicable substantive law. In all cases the tribunal must
consider trade usages, and may act as amiable compositeur only if the
parties expressly authorize it to do so.52 Where the arbitral tribunal is
composed of more than one arbitrator, decisions are made by the ma-
jority of the arbitration.53 Procedural questions, however, may be de-
cided by an appointed presiding arbitrator.
Articles 30 through 32 govern the conclusion of the arbitration by
award or otherwise. The parties may settle the dispute, and thus end
the arbitration proceeding. 54 Alternatively, the tribunal may termi-
nate the arbitral proceedings if a party withdraws his claim, or contin-
uation is unnecessary or impossible.55 If the proceeding continues,
however, and an award is made, such an award must be in writing,
and signed by the majority of the arbitrators, stating the date and loca-
tion of the arbitration. 56 Absent agreement to the contrary, the award
also must state the tribunal's reasoning.
5 7
Article 33 governs correction of awards. The tribunal, on its own
initiative or on that of a party, may correct clerical or typographical
errors. A party also may request an additional award for claims
presented to the tribunal, but not considered in the award. The tribu-
nal, however, may not interpret the meaning of its award unless the
48. Id. art. 25. This is not a default power, but rather a ruling on that which is presented to
the tribunal. See art. 25(b). The result, however, seems to be the same.
49. See infra pt. IV.
50. The travaux preparaloires indicate that this provision applies to oral evidence of a wit-
ness, documents, and other property. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/246 paras. 90-101, and U.N. Doc. A/
40/17 para. 228.
51. Model Law, supra note I, art. 28.
52. Id. art. 28(4).
53. Id. art. 29
54. Id. art. 30.
55. Id. art. 32.
56. Id. art. 31.
57. Id. art. 31(2).
[Vol. 10:912
Summer 1989] Note, International Commercial Arbitration
parties agree otherwise. That is to say, assuming the parties agree that
the tribunal may not interpret its award, a party may not, after the
award has been made, seek interpretation by the tribunal.
Chapter VII. Recourse Against the Award
Article 34 provides the sole mechanism by which the losing party,
on its own initiative, may set aside the award. It excludes any addi-
tional forms of recourse otherwise available in the state where arbitra-
tion occurs. By adopting the Model Law, states are able to assure
foreigners that article 34 will be the only possible means for setting
aside an award in that particular jurisdiction. 58 Taken largely from
article V of the New York Convention, permissible grounds for setting
aside an award are:
- lack of the parties' capacity to conclude an arbitration agreement, or
lack of a valid arbitration agreement;
- where the aggrieved party was not given proper notice of the appoint-
ment of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral proceedings, or was other-
wise unable to present his case;
- where the award deals with matters not covered by the arbitration
clause or submission agreement, thereby rendering the arbitral tribunal
incompetent for lack of jurisdiction;
- where the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral proce-
dure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or where it
was not in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Model Law
itself;
- non-arbitrability of the subject matter of the dispute;
- where the award (or any decision in it) conflicts with the public policy
of the state where the arbitration takes place.59
An aggrieved party's application to set aside an award must be made
to the article 6 court within three months after the party receives no-
tice of the award. However, even where one of the parties discovers a
defect in the judgment, the court may suspend proceedings to permit
the arbitral tribunal to remedy the award. 6°
Chapter VIII. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards
Articles 35 and 36 govern recognition and enforcement of awards.
The losing party may decide not to use article 34 to set aside the judg-
ment, but rather seek to avoid recognition of the award when the win-
ner tries to enforce it in another jurisdiction. Valid grounds for
avoiding recognition of the award largely parallel those for setting
aside the award. 61 However, a very significant difference emerges be-
58. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 23, at 400.
59. Model Law, supra note 1, arts. 34(2) & (3); see also REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 23,
at 400.
60. Model Law, supra note 1, art. 34(4).
61. Id. art. 36.
Michigan Journal of International Law
tween the two procedures in their application. Under the Model Law,
set-aside actions can occur only in the country where the award was
made, while avoiding recognition and enforcement may occur in any
country upon compliance with certain requirements. 62 This suggests
that a party may prefer a set-aside action in the arbitration tribunal's
jurisdiction. By preventing the winning party from enforcing the
award in a second country, the losing party will not destroy the award.
The winners will be free to go to yet a third country for recognition
and enforcement.
II. How A STATE SHOULD Go ABOUT MAKING THE DECISION
TO ADOPT THE MODEL RULES
If U.S. courts honor and enforce international arbitration decisions
according to the terms of the parties' agreement, then one might infer
that no valid reason exists to justify adoption of the Model Law. One
might presume that, at most, bits and pieces of the Model Law should
be adopted to fill any gaps in existing law. States that have adopted
the Model Law, as well as commentators in states considering adop-
tion, however, have responded to this line of reasoning by indicating
that adopting selected articles is not an option.
63
The idea that the Model Law should be adopted as a package to
avoid disturbing its balance has prevailed. The Canadian jurisdic-
tions, 64 Cyprus, and Nigeria have adopted legislation which closely
follows the Model Law. Adoption of the Model law en bloc in Austra-
lia and Hong Kong is imminent. 65 Egypt, England, 66 and Scotland are
among the countries presently considering adoption of some form of
the Model Law. Other states, however, have chosen not to adopt the
Model Law.
67
62. The party seeking enforcement must supply (I) the authenticated award or copy, (2) the
original arbitration agreement or copy, and (3) a certified translation of the award and agreement
if necessary. Id. art. 35.
63. However, this is not to say that there was or is not a conflict on this issue. Two theories
on the adoption of the Model Law have developed: the "anthology" view and the "package"
view. The "anthology" view subscribes to the idea that adopting states could adopt the text in
altered form and make what use of it they wish, without violating the spirit of the effort.
Alternatively, the "package" view holds that substantial changes or omissions in the text
would disturb the balance of the Model Law. Moreover, such changes would reduce the Model
Law's value as a harmonizing agent. To date, the "package" view has prevailed in the states
which have adopted the Model Law. Herrmann, For an UNCITRAL Model Restatement of
Arbitration Law in the United Kingdom, 4 ARB. INT'L 62, 64 (1988).
64. The federal government and all the provinces and territories except Quebec have adopted
the Model Law. Graham, The Internationalization of Commercial Arbitration in Canada: A Pre-
liminary Reaction, 13 CAN. Bus. L.J. 2, 3 (1987-1988).
65. Herrmann, supra note 63, at 64.
66. The United Kingdom and the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 9, at 285.
67. Both The Netherlands and Switzerland have declined adoption of the Model Law. How-
ever, a number of the new Dutch Arbitration Act's provisions correspond to Model Law articles.
See NETHERLANDS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHT-
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The decision to adopt the Model Law in whole or in part is a func-
tion of a state's assessment and categorization of its own domestic ar-
bitration law. 68 For a state with no developed arbitration law,
adoption of the Model Law presents an opportunity to gain a ready-
made law having the "international hallmark of approval derived from
UNCITRAL. '' 69 Adoption of the Model Law for a state with preex-
isting but unsatisfactory arbitration law70 brings not only the UNCI-
TRAL stamp of approval, but also assurances to foreign parties that
agreements based on the Model Law will be enforced. 7' Other states
may adopt the Model Law in an attempt to present an attractive locale
for international arbitration procedures and to demonstrate their lead-
ership in international cooperation. 72 When a state believes, however,
that its arbitration laws are developed and not "unsatisfactory," the
decision to accept or reject the Model Law involves more complicated
rationales.
73
Although many would argue that U.S. international commercial
arbitration law falls within the last catagory, 74 this is not an obvious
assumption. In fact, all of the categories likely apply to the United
States' situation. Certainly American arbitrators want to attract inter-
national arbitration proceedings to United States territories. 75 More-
over, most American parties to international agreements would rather
arbitrate in the United States than in a distant country. Finally, there
are foreigners and non-foreigners who find the international arbitra-
tion laws in the United States inadequate for some reason or another.
76
International arbitration law in the United States does contain an
element of each of these categories. Any decision to accept or reject
the Model Law should be made against the backdrop of such consider-
SVORDERING) Bk. IV, arts. 1020-1076 (Neth. 1986); see also Sanders, The New Dutch Arbitration
Act, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 41, 44 (1987).
68. See Herrmann, supra note 63, at 64.
69. Davenport, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: the
User's Choice, 4 ARB. INT'L 69, 70 (1988).
70. By "unsatisfactory" it is meant that the system of arbitration laws is "obsolete, incom-
plete or not impartial." Id. at 71.
71. Where the existing law is or appears to be unsatisfactory to the potential buyer or seller,
negotiations may come to a halt. At this point, the deal will either be lost or the opposing party
will agree to dispute resolution elsewhere or in another manner. See Id.
72. Given the recent opening of the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration
Centre in Vancouver, see generally Thompson, A British Columbia Perspective On International
Arbitration, 13 CAN. Bus. L.J. 70 (1987-1988), Canada is properly classified as a state attempt-
ing to attract arbitration through use of the Model Law.
73. Davenport, supra note 69, at 73.
74. Based on its recommendations, the Committee seems to subscribe to this view. Report,
supra note 1, at 311.
75. Some states, in an effort to attract international arbitration, have taken it upon them-
selves to adopt international arbitration legislation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684 (Supp.
1988); see also CAL. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 9.3, §§ 1297.11 - 1297.432 (Deering 1988).
76. See Sanders, supra note 67.
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ations. Congress should consider factors such as the need to attract
more international arbitration to the United States and the need to
make foreign parties feel comfortable with the American system.
Moreover, Congress' decision regarding adoption or rejection of the
Model Law should also take into account the developments in other
common law jurisdictions. For example, the reasons for adoption of
the Model Law in Canada may support adoption in the United States
as well.
III. ASSESSING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Current State of American International Arbitration Law
The United States offers a hospitable climate for the growth of in-
ternational arbitration. This is largely due to legislation favoring arbi-
tration, 77 and a judiciary supportive of arbitration.
78
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has indicated its willingness to
enforce arbitration agreements, and has demonstrated its understand-
ing that international arbitration is a special animal. In Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co.,7 9 the Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate
disputes arising from an international transaction involving corporate
securities. The Court favored arbitration, despite federal securities
law which granted an absolute right to a judicial determination of
claims. 80 The Court recognized the uniqueness of international
transactions:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which dis-
putes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost indis-
pensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and
predictability essential to any international business transaction ....
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an interna-
tional arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but
would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties
to secure tactical litigation advantages. In the present case, for example,
it is not inconceivable that if Scherk had anticipated that Alberto-Culver
would be able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he might
have sought an order in France or some other country enjoining Alberto-
Culver from proceeding with its litigation in the United States.
Whatever recognition the courts of this country might ultimately have
granted to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of such a
77. See generally Hoellering, International Commercial Arbitration: The United States Per-
spective, in UNCITRAL ARBITRATION MODEL IN CANADA 17 (Paterson and Thompson ed.
1986) [hereinafter Hoellering].
78. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), where the court states,
"We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on
our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts."
79. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
80. 417 U.S. at 513.
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legal no-man's land would surely damage the fabric of international
commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of business-.
men to enter into international commercial agreements. 8'
By recognizing the importance of honoring the agreement which the
parties made between themselves, the Court broke important ground
for the growth of international commercial arbitration in the United
States.
The Court further displayed its favorable attitude toward interna-
tional arbitration agreements in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 8 2 The Court determined that where a trans-
national agreement containing a broad arbitration clause exists, anti-
trust claims are arbitrable, despite a domestic public policy proscribing
future agreements to arbitrate such claims. Relying heavily on Scherk,
the Court stated:
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the ca-
pacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need
of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolu-
tion of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even as-
suming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic
context.
83
Once again, the Court recognized the uniqueness of international com-
mercial dispute resolution and the importance of enforcing the parties'
agreement to arbitrate.
The most recent example of the Court's general willingness to en-
force arbitration agreements came in Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon. 84 There, the Court went so far as to state that domestic
section 10(b) securities claims, 85 and claims under section 1964(c) of
the Civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), are arbitrable. 86
In sum, party autonomy appears to be motivating judge-made in-
ternational arbitration law in the United States. 87 Barring an overrid-
ing public policy, courts will continue to enforce the parties'
agreement to arbitrate. If the arbitration agreement is valid, courts
generally will refrain from interfering in arbitration disputes beyond
enforcement of the agreement or award. 88
81. 417 U.S. at 516-517.
82. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
83. 473 U.S. at 629.
84. 55 U.S.L.W. 4757 (1987).
85. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4762.
86. 55 U.S.L.W. at 4763.
87. Hoellering, supra note 77, at 18.
88. Id.
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B. Does American International Arbitration Law Need Reform?
Before asking whether Congress should adopt the Model Law, one
must determine whether the United States presently needs a new inter-
national arbitration statute. The answer to this question partially lies
in the demands presently placed on available statutes. A partial an-
swer also lies in the desirability of arbitration, especially from the
view-point of international parties, as a method of dispute resolution.
Arbitration offers a number of advantages over litigation for par-
ties involved in international commercial transaction disputes. Under
the FAA or the Model Law, arbitration allows the parties to select the
number and identity of the arbitrators.8 9 This allows parties to choose
arbitrators who have a particular expertise or background necessary to
settle the dispute. Moreover, to the extent that parties appoint arbitra-
tors from different countries, an unduly nationalistic decision-making
panel will be avoided. Finally, arbitrators of different nationalities are
inclined to make decisions that will receive a greater measure of ac-
ceptance and enforcement at the transnational level. 90
Arbitration also offers a speedy and less expensive alternative to
the burdensome litigation process in the United States. Parties to arbi-
tration may select procedural rules which will enable them to limit the
time within which the dispute must be resolved. Arbitration proce-
dures generally are flexible, avoiding undue emphasis on technical
matters like pleadings and the introduction of evidence. 9' Finally, ar-
bitration can offer foreign parties the benefit of not having to hire addi-
tional counsel.
92
Moreover, an increasing number of international companies and
individuals are turning to arbitration as a tool for dispute resolution.
Parties to international business transactions prefer arbitration to liti-
gation, because of arbitration's intended efficiency. 93 If parties to an
agreement, however, anticipate that they will encounter difficulties in
determining the law within a particular jurisdiction, they will arbitrate
elsewhere, or resort to expensive and time-consuming litigation.
94
89. In most cases, the parties generally feel more confident if there are three arbitrators.
Helal, International Commercial Arbitration, 53 ARBITRATION 258 (1987).
The Model Law permits parties to choose who and how many arbitrators there will be.
Model Law, supra note I, art. 10. If the parties fail to decide, the number of arbitrators will be
three. Id. art. 10(2).
For a discussion of the advantages in international dispute resolution of choosing the deci-
sion-makers, see Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transna-
tional Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 15 (1986).
90. Smit, supra note 89, at 10.
91. Id. at 12 n.1l.
92. Foreign parties would not need to hire an American attorney to represent them in court.
However, if the arbitration law is seen as being too complicated, a party forced to arbitrate here
may well have to hire additional counsel.
93. See Smit, supra note 89, at 11.
94. Until 1986, the Dutch had in place an arbitration act dating back to 1838. The act went
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Parties familiar with the Model Law through its use in other jurisdic-
tions, however, will presumably be more comfortable arbitrating in the
United States should Congress choose to adopt it.
The present U.S. arbitration statute, the FAA, is, however, an in-
adequate solution to many of the problems encountered by interna-
tional parties wishing to arbitrate their claims in the United States.
Congress enacted the statute in 1925. Since then the courts have
struggled to sculpt U.S. arbitration law in an effort to maintain pace
with the increasingly complex demands that parties have placed on the
procedures. 95 Modern day questions continue to arise in the context
of international arbitrations that the FAA simply cannot answer. 96 If
the statutory language provides no answer to a party's question, that
party then must employ a lawyer to investigate the law. 97 This in-
creases costs and delays, thereby undermining many of the fundamen-
tal goals of arbitration. Adopting the Model Law, however, will
relieve many foreign parties of the need to hire an additional attorney.
The party's domestic attorney, if versed on the Model Law, will draft
a reliable arbitration agreement.
Moreover, congress enacted the FAA during a time when arbitra-
tion procedures were viewed as usurping the court's power.98 Atti-
tudes changed as the legal community realized that arbitration
provided an efficient, agreeable means to settle disputes. Many also
correctly anticipated that arbitration would reduce court backlog.
The Act, however, was created primarily as a mechanism to enforce
arbitration agreements.99
Looking at the Act's core sections confirms that it is a mechanism
to enforce arbitration agreements. Section 2 provides that written
agreements to arbitrate in "any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce" are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
virtually unchanged for 150 years. In order for the act to function and survive, the courts
broadly interpreted its provisions. "[B]y 1986, a reliable picture of arbitration practice in the
Netherlands could not be gained by consulting the language of the 1838 Act alone. The vast
body of case law that had developed over 150 years had grown to be equally important, and had
to be consulted as well. This situation had become rather cumbersome, especially for foreign-
ers." Sanders, supra note 67, at 41.
Moreover, even where a state does not have as troublesome a system as did the Dutch, it is
the parties' perceptions that are important. If a state's arbitration rules appear unsatisfactory to
a potential user, then they will be avoided. See Davenport, supra note 69, at 71.
95. See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
96. For example, the FAA is silent about fees, consolidation of cases, governing procedures,
as well as a number of other issues.
97. If the party is a foreigner with foreign counsel not versed in American law, he will be
forced to employ one who is, in order to find the answer.
98. For a history of arbitration and the FAA, see Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy:
The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985).
99. See Note, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV.
1137 (Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985)).
Michigan Journal of International Law
for the revocation of any contract."' ° Section 3 declares that if the
issue before a court is provided for in the arbitration agreement, a
party may obtain a stay of litigation "in any of the courts of the
United States."' 0 ' Assuming an arbitration agreement exists, section 4
allows the aggrieved party to "petition any United States district
court, which save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction ... for
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner pro-
vided for in such agreement."' 10 2
Designed as an enforcement mechanism, the FAA provides little
guidance to the drafter of an arbitration agreement. Beyond sug-
gesting that arbitrator selection be agreed upon before arbitration,
0 3
the FAA offers virtually no guidance in drafting the agreement. As a
result, both international and domestic parties contemplating arbitra-
tion are without a federal statute indicating what provisions of an arbi-
tration agreement would be useful and honored. The implications,
however, are likely to be more serious for parties involved in interna-
tional transactions. If an arbitration breaks down between domestic
parties, they are assured at least that a U.S. court will be deciding
issues. The problem for international arbitrations is furthered by the
fact that the drafter (usually a lawyer) is often unsure how to approach
the problem of creating the arbitration agreement. Some lawyers are
unaware that the Model Law is not U.S. law. They make the mistake
of confusing the UNCITRAL Rules, which are U.S. law, with the
Model Law. Confusion on the part of the drafters, of course, is not, in
itself, a reason for the United States to adopt the Model Law. Some of
this confusion, however, should certainly be eliminated if the Model
Law is adopted.
Additionally, adopting the Model Law will provide parties with
law that is useful in drafting better international arbitration agree-
ments. The key here is that the Model Law, or some form of it, would
be law. To be sure, if international parties presently agreed to be
bound by the provisions of the Model Law, section 4 of the FAA
would say that the agreement must be enforced. For that matter, no
obvious reason exists why domestic parties could not agree to be
bound by the Model Law.
Enacting the Model Law, however, will force drafters to look at its
provisions in order to decide numerous questions that might otherwise
go unasked. 10 4 Without the Model Law, "[a] company that desired
arbitration in London in the language of Shakespeare may instead end
up with French proceedings in Toulon in the language of Moli~re, or
100. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1982).
101. Id. § 3.
102. Id. § 4.
103. Id. § 5.
104. See infra note 146.
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proceedings before Saudi courts in Riyadh in the language of the
Prophet Mohammed."' 10 5 By enacting the Model Law, sophisticated
and unsophisticated lawyers alike will have in place a drafting aid.
Working with the Model Law, drafters will be alerted to issues such as
the language to be used, 10 6 the arbitration's locale, 0 7 the applicable
substantive and procedural laws, 108 and the use of expert witnesses. 109
In short, the U.S. will have a law which notifies a drafter of alternative
provisions, most of which are universally incorporated into successful
international arbitration agreements.
Strong arguments support this Note's recommendation that Con-
gress adopt the Model Law. By doing so, foreign parties will be more
comfortable arbitrating with U.S. parties in the United States. Addi-
tionally, drafters will be able to draw up arbitration agreements com-
petently, furthering the parties' best interest. The net result is that
arbitration agreements will be better able to serve their intended
purposes.
To achieve these results, Congress should adopt the Model Law
essentially en bloc. Admittedly, some provisions of the FAA and the
adopted Model Law will be duplicative."10 This, however, is a small
price to pay for the benefits that will be derived from adopting a com-
plementary set of rules for international arbitration. Moreover, the
spirit of the Model Law"'I is not violated if Congress slightly alters the
law to make it suitable for adoption." 12
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMITTEE'S CRITICISMS
In the leading article analyzing the pros and cons of adoption of
the Model Law by the United States, the Committee recommends
against en bloc adoption. Alternatively, the Committee recommends
that only some Model Law articles are ripe for amendment to the
FAA. One reason for the Committee's recommendation against en
bloc adoption is that the Model Law supposedly contains flawed provi-
sions. The Committee attacks three articles: Articles 16, 17, and 26.
A. Article 16
The Committee first recommends against amending Model Law,
105. Park, Arbitration of International Contract Disputes, 39 Bus. LAW. 1783, at 1784
(1984).
106. Model Law, supra note 1, art. 22. See infra notes 145-6 and accompanying text.
107. Model Law, supra note 1, art. 20.
108. Id. arts. 19 & 28.
109. Id. art. 26. See infra notes 124-133 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
I11. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
112. For a side-by-side comparison of the Model Law and the Arbitration Act of British
Columbia, see Hoellering, supra note 77, at 174.
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article 16.113 Under article 16(3), if the arbitration tribunal prelimina-
rily decides that it has jurisdiction over a claim, a party has thirty days
to appeal to the article 6 court, whose decision is unappealable. The
Committee argues that such a provision should not be adopted be-
cause (1) it may encourage frivolous appeals burdening the arbitration
process with wasted effort and expense, and (2) a party can achieve the
same goal by submitting the issue to a domestic court in a suit to en-
join the arbitration."14
The Committee itself notes the argument that "an immediate ap-
peal would avoid the time and expense of conducting an arbitral pro-
ceeding in cases where the tribunal erroneously decides that it has
jurisdiction.""15 There is, however, no other appeal under 16(3) which
is relevant. Article 16(3) does not authorize an appeal from a tribu-
nal's decision that it does not have jurisdiction. Where the article 6
court affirms the tribunal's jurisdictional decision, no appeal is avail-
able. As a result, the arbitration can proceed with little or no worry
that the jurisdiction issue will be reversed in a subsequent proceeding
to enforce or vacate the award.
The frivolous appeals argument is even less convincing. If one
party unnecessarily appeals a tribunal's finding of jurisdiction, the
other may resort to FAA section 4.116 Moreover, it is probable that
the party appealing such a decision will be more cautious than the
Committee suggests because the arbitration may, notwithstanding ap-
peal, proceed. "
7
Finally, the Committee argues, without citing supporting author-
ity, that 16(3) is "unnecessary" because parties can sue to enjoin the
arbitration. While it may be common practice for courts to use their
equity powers to enjoin arbitration, neither the FAA" 8 nor the New
York Convention' 19 explicitly permit this remedy. If the Committee
argues that article 16(3) should be rejected as cumulative, it is clearly
mistaken.
113. This article is entitled, "Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction."
114. Report, supra note 1, at 316.
115. Id.
116. Section 4 states in pertinent part: "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner pro-
vided for in such agreement." FAA, supra note 5, as referenced in text.
117. Parties will be cautious not to appeal unnecessarily when it may offend an arbitrator or
when the arbitration appears likely to continue.
118. Section 3 governs stays of judicial proceedings, and section 4 involves proceeding to
arbitration. FAA, supra note 5.
119. The New York Convention governs the recognition and enforcement of awards, not
stays of arbitration.
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B. Article 17
The Committee also recommends that Congress reject article
17.120 This provision authorizes the arbitration tribunal, unless the
parties agree otherwise, to order interim protection measures, and re-
quires any party to provide adequate security in connection with such
measures. The Committee recommends rejecting this article because
"at least one U.S. district court' 2' has recognized that arbitrators have
an implied or inherent power to order interim measures . . . ," and
"section 34 of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") Rule
contains an express, though limited, provision on this subject."'
22
This argument fails to withstand scrutiny. Unless the Committee
can cite more than one supporting U.S. district court decision, it re-
mains unclear whether United States law dictates that arbitrators may
grant interim relief. Moreover, section 34 of the AAA Rules provides
assistance only to the extent that the parties have agreed to be bound
by such rules, or that a particular court is willing to look at such rules
for guidance. 23 Finally, the Committee ignores the fact that if the
parties do not want an arbitrator to have such powers, they can agree,
under article 17, to remove them.
C. Article 26
Third, the Committee criticizes article 26.124 Article 26 provides
that, unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal may appoint ex-
perts to report on specific issues, 25 and requires parties to provide
information to expert witnesses. 2 6 Such expert witnesses shall also
participate in the hearings and be examined by the parties. 27 The
Committee cites four problems caused by this article: (1) the ability of
arbitration tribunals to select truly qualified, independent experts, (2)
the unnecessary use of experts, (3) undue delay, and (4) increased
expense. ' 2
8
Arbitration tribunals are unlikely to abuse the power to appoint
120. Article 17 is entitled, "Power of arbitral tribunal to order interim measures," Model
Law, supra note 1.
121. Park City Ass'ns v. Total Energy Leasing Corp., 58 A.D.2d 786 (N.Y.App.Div. 1977).
122. Under the AAA's section 34, "[T]he arbitrator may issue such orders for interim relief
as may be deemed necessary to safeguard the property that is the subject matter of the arbitration
... .Article 17 appears to be less narrow in that the tribunal may take such measures of protec-
tion 'in respect of the subject matter of the dispute."
123. If parties agree to be bound by the AAA rules then such rules will be applied. However,
a court will be hard pressed, especially in the international context, to justify application of
institutionalized domestic arbitration rules.
124. Article 26 is entitled, "Expert appointed by arbitral tribunal," Model Law, supra note I.
125. Id. art. 26 (l)(a).
126. Id. art. 26(l)(b).
127. Id. art. 26(2).
128. Report, supra note 1, at 317.
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expert witnesses. If arbitrators misuse or abuse such powers, parties
will habitually agree beforehand that no tribunal experts be appointed.
Similar results will arise if expert selection by arbitrators unduly in-
creases costs and causes delays. Moreover, since parties to interna-
tional arbitration agreements favor appointing three arbitrators,
29
only rarely would a majority agree to call unnecessary or unqualified
experts.
In addition to the criticisms of article 26, the Committee further
argues that "such a provision would be unlikely to win the support of
the legal profession."'' 30 Assuming the importance of lawyers' senti-
ments in this regard,' 3 ' that argument inadequately supports rejection
of article 26. Courts already have the authority to actively participate
in the expert testimony process.'
32
When confronted with a battle between expert witnesses, clear
value exists in allowing the court to select a neutral expert witness.
Even absent such a battle, court power to select a neutral expert wit-
ness still serves a useful purpose. Although judges seldom appoint ex-
perts, "[t]he ever-present possibility that the judge may appoint an
expert in a given case must inevitably exert a sobering effect on the
expert witness of a party and upon the person utilizing his services." 1
33
In summary, the Committee's recommendations remain unsatis-
factory. Its analysis of articles 16, 17, and 26 of the Model Law does
not withstand close scrutiny. These particular provisions add flexibil-
ity to the Model Law, and to that extent are useful. If parties wish to
exclude these articles from their arbitration agreement, they may con-
tract out of them. Moreover, the Committee ignores the remaining
Model Law articles, except to recommend amending the FAA by ad-
ding articles 9, 12, 20 and 28. If there is something internally wrong
with the Model Law which calls for its rejection, the Committee fails
to identify it.
V. CRITIQUE OF OTHER MODEL LAW ARTICLES
The Committee criticizes the Model Law for its internal flaws and
inconsistencies. In its report, however, the Committee fails to demon-
strate adequately those flaws. Other articles, upon which the Commit-
129. See Helal, supra note 89, at 258.
130. Report, supra note 1, at 317.
131. The view of the parties themselves - the international businessmen - is what should
rule, not the American legal community.
132. Under FED. R. EVID. 706: "[T]he court may appoint any expert witness agreed upon by
the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection .... A witness so appointed
shall advise the parties of his finding if any ... and he may be called to testify by the court or any
party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling him as a
witness."
133. See Notes Of Advisory Committee On Proposed Rules To FED. R. EvID. 707.
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tee did not focus, may perhaps contain flaws that should cause
Congress to hesitate before adopting the Model Law en bloc.
The Committee offers three primary reasons for recommending
non-adoption of certain articles.134 The articles are: (1) duplicative of
existing law,' 35 (2) subject to tribunal abuse, 36 and (3) susceptible to
causing undue delay. 137 These bases for rejection may be employed to
test the suitability of each of the remaining Model Law articles.
A. Duplicative of Existing Law
Several Model Law articles duplicate existing arbitration law
under the FAA sections ("sections"). Article 5, concerning the extent
of court intervention, parallels section 6: that parties are limited in
their ability to apply for judicial relief by the arbitration statute. Arti-
cle 7 contains a somewhat expanded version of the section 2 require-
ment that the arbitration agreement be in written form. Article 8,
concerning the arbitration agreement and substantive claims before
the court, and section 4 both require the court to refer the parties to
arbitration unless a fatal defect appears in the agreement. Section 5 of
the FAA largely overlaps four of the Model Law articles. Article 10
and section 5 are duplicative in that they let the parties determine the
number of arbitrators. 38 Similarly, article 11 and section 5 both indi-
cate that the parties may specify the individuals who will be the arbi-
trators or the methods by which they will be chosen. 39  Moreover,
articles 14 and 15 duplicate section 5; both indicate that the original
method of appointment be used to replace an arbitrator unable to con-
tinue his duties.
Articles 18 and 27 also duplicate FAA sections. Article 18 and
section 10(b) both indicate that impartial treatment shall be accorded
each party.' 40 Finally, article 27 and section 7 both call for the court
to assist in the acquiring of evidence and securing of witnesses.
The final set of articles which largely duplicate FAA sections in-
volve making the award. Both laws, with minor deviations, require
134. If an article has flaws which would prevent it from being amended, the same flaws
would likely support any argument that the Model Law should not be adopted in its present
form.
135. See supra, pt. IV on art. 16.
136. Id. on article 26.
137. Id. on Article 17.
138. However, article 10 calls for three arbitrators when the parties fail to determine the
number, and section 5 calls for one.
139. Both provisions also indicate that, absent an agreed method of naming arbitrators, the
court will do the appointing. Article 11(5) states that if the court makes this decision no appeal
can be taken. Alternatively, section 5 does not indicate whether a court's decision to designate a
particular arbitrator is subject to appeal.
140. However, to the extent that section 10(b) indicates that this is a ground for vacation it
does go further than the language of article 18.
Michigan Journal of International Law
the award to be in writing. 141 Each permits the arbitrators to correct
typographical errors in the award. 42 Permissible reasons for setting
aside the award are largely identical. 43 Moreover, similar conditions
justify recognition and enforcement under both laws.44
B. Articles Not Subject to Abuse or Causing Delay
A number of Model Law provisions are designed such that they
cannot cause delay or significantly increase arbitration costs. Articles
I and 2 merely contain definitions. 145 Article 3 establishes the time at
which communications are deemed received.
Similarly, article 22 will not be subject to abuse. Article 22 con-
tains the rules governing the language to be be used at the arbitration.
The parties are free to agree on the language to be used. Failing such
an agreement, the tribunal will decide the language to be used. One
can imagine that problems could be encountered where there are nu-
merous foreign parties and arbitrators involved. The parties were
able, however, to communicate in order to create an arbitration agree-
ment and it is likely that they will do the same if the need to arbitrate
arises. 146 Moreover, if the parties or arbitrators require a translation,
only a marginal delay will result and party satisfation will outweigh
the burden involved.
C. Provisions Which Are Designed to Expedite Arbitration
Many Model Law provisions will expedite the arbitration process.
The Model Law recognizes that the parties themselves are in the best
position to decide which procedures will facilitate a speedy resolution.
It therefore provides them with the power to decide such issues. Arti-
cles 19, 21, 23, and 24 allow the parties to decide when arbitration
begins, what procedural law will apply, and whether hearings will be
conducted.
Two final provisions which facilitate arbitration are articles 25 and
29. By permitting the tribunal to render an award where a party fails
to make a claim or defense, article 25 prevents a party from stalling
141. Art. 31(1) & § 13. However, note that article 31(2) requires that the arbitrators state
the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties otherwise agree.
For permissible reasons for setting aside the award, see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying
text.
142. Art. 33 & § 11.
143. Art. 34 & § 10.
144. Art. 35 & § 207, ch. 2.
145. See supra pt. I.
146. Professor Whitmore Gray argues that generally no more than a procedural "shell" ex-
ists under statutory schemes and that an agreed-to procedure will be enforced. Agreement, how-
ever, is usually put off until a problem to be arbitrated arises. At this point, Gray argues, parties
will be unwilling to agree. One party will try putting up barriers to arbitration to force a com-
promise or settlement.
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the proceedings by failing to act. Assuming there is an odd number of
arbitrators, article 29 facilitates arbitration by requiring all non-proce-
dural questions to be decided by a majority of the arbitrators.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT AGAINST ADOPTION OF THE
MODEL LAW
An argument against adoption of the Model Law exists and should
not go unnoticed. Rejection of en bloc adoption, however, should not
be founded on any internal flaws attributed to the Model Law. The
Committee fails to adequately justify such a conclusion. A better ar-
gument against adoption may be grounded in the suggestion that a
better alternative does or will exist. For instance, Professor Smit ar-
gues for a single transnational arbitration institution.147 He notes that
numerous arbitration institutions currently operate and compete with
one another:
The needs of international intercourse cannot effectively be served by the
rapidly increasing number of international arbitration institutions with
different rules and processes administered by persons of different training
and competence at greatly differing costs. Businessmen and their law-
yers cannot make a reasoned choice from among the many alternatives
offered them. Moreover, as long as there is no institution that offers
optimum flexibility, their choices remain unduly limited. The appropri-
ate solution is to create a single international institution that would offer
all possible advantages of institutional arbitration anywhere in the
world. 1
48
With this in mind, the Model Law may only present parties with
another means by which to settle their disputes. Efforts might be bet-
ter aimed at creating a global arbitration institution and away from
adopting the Model Law. If our goal is to create a single world insti-
tution, then that goal may be stifled by adopting a statute to compete
with already existing institutions.
CONCLUSION
The United States presently faces the question of whether to adopt
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration. To date,
American journals have provided no answers to this question. The
Washington Foreign Law Society's Committee which studied the
Model Law takes the position that the Model Law contains flaws, and
conflicts in several ways with United States' present arbitration law.
Consequently, the Committee recommends that Congress avoid adopt-
ing the Model Law en bloc, and instead amend the FAA to include
only certain Model Law provisions.
The Committee's arguments, however, provide only inadequate so-
147. Smit, supra note 89.
148. Id. at 29.
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lutions. The Model Law is designed to permit party autonomy, and to
facilitate a speedy, efficient, and satisfactory dispute resolution pro-
cess. The three articles attacked by the Committee 149 are necessary
parts of this scheme.
Moreover, the Committee's suggestion that international arbitra-
tion law in the United States is adequate merely begs the question.
The Committee fails to address foreign parties' inability to gain access
to one comprehensive source of United States law for answers to a
number of important arbitration questions. Other than mentioning
that some states have adopted the Model Law, the Committee fails to
mention the factors that these states considered in making such
decisions.
Reasons to justify rejection of the Model Law may exist. Adoption
of the Model Law en bloc may be inconsistent with some higher inter-
national goal, such as the one suggested by Professor Smit. At this
time, however, these reasons do not adequately justify a rejection of en
bloc adoption.
Adoption of the Model Law en bloc, however, is justified on
grounds of its uniformity and its usefulness.' 50 Drafters of arbitration
who are presently confused will be given a guide to aid them in draft-
ing arbitration agreements that serve the interests of their clients as
well as the policies of arbitration itself.
149. Model Law, supra note 1, arts. 16, 17, & 26.
150. See supra notes 93-112 & accompanying text.
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